来源：财经会议圈

　　拆解史上最大IPO背后的资本收割游戏

　　华盛顿的“拦路虎”

　　2026年6月11日，就在SpaceX距离正式登陆纳斯达克仅剩不到24小时之际，一封火药味十足的12页信函直抵美国证券交易委员会（SEC）。

　　发信人不是别人，正是以“华尔街死敌”著称的民主党参议员伊丽莎白·沃伦（Elizabeth Warren）。她在信中措辞激烈地要求SEC：必须推迟SpaceX的IPO上市，这场“史上最大规模IPO”对投资者保护和市场完整性构成了前所未有的威胁。

　　沃伦在信中写下了一句振聋发聩的警告：

“你们必须推迟该登记声明的生效时间。SpaceX的IPO创造了一个新问题：它正在操纵主要的股市指数，强迫数百万投资指数基金的普通散户在别无选择的情况下，被迫承担SpaceX的巨大风险。”

　　这话听起来刺耳，但细看SpaceX的上市设计，你会发现沃伦的担忧绝非杞人忧天。

　　离谱的“一口价”

　　135美元的爱买不买

　　传统IPO的玩法，大家都懂：投行先给一个价格区间，比如100-120美元，然后根据市场认购情况最终定价，这叫“价格发现”。

　　但SpaceX不玩这一套。

　　它直接甩出135美元/股的“一口价”，爱买不买。

　　这在华尔街历史上极为罕见。一家公司估值高达1.75万亿-2万亿美元，却连最基本的市场博弈定价环节都省了，摆明了就是“我说多少就是多少”。

　　更离谱的是散户分配比例。

　　美股常规IPO，散户份额通常只有5%-10%，绝大多数份额都会留给长期持有的机构基石投资者。但SpaceX反其道而行之，将30%的IPO份额分配给散户，金额高达225亿美元。

　　外界普遍吹捧这是“让利散户、共享红利”，但内行看门道：

• 机构投资者追求长期稳定、风险可控，是市场的压舱石；

• 散户受情绪、舆论、偶像滤镜驱动，盲目跟风、追涨杀跌，波动率极高。

　　马斯克拥有庞大的粉丝群体，他们会自发造势、无脑买入，短期强行推高股价。但后续只要出现任何负面舆情，即便公司基本面毫无变化，股价也会因为散户情绪崩塌而大幅跳水。

　　参考历史案例：Robinhood曾将35%新股份额分给散户，上市后被散户爆炒至85美元，热度褪去后半年暴跌至15美元，高位接盘散户全线深套。

　　SpaceX本次散户占比极高，未来必然复刻同款走势：短期情绪拉涨，长期散户买单。

　　估值泡沫

　　市销率100倍的天方夜谭

　　SpaceX的估值到底有多离谱？我们来看看硬数据。

　　2025年，SpaceX全年营收187亿美元，估值却突破1.75万亿美元，市销率接近100倍。

　　做个对比：

• AI龙头Anthropic估值近万亿美元，市销率仅21倍；

• OpenAI市销率也只有34倍；

• 这两家AI企业的营收增速，远高于SpaceX，估值倍数却远低于它。

　　对比之下就能发现，所谓的AI泡沫，和SpaceX的估值泡沫相比，根本不值一提。

　　更夸张的是，招股书中宣称公司远期潜在市场规模（TAM）高达28.5万亿美元。这个数字是什么概念？远超中国全年20万亿级的GDP体量，完全脱离现实商业逻辑，纯属夸张造势。

　　还有马斯克的薪酬解锁条件：授予其10亿股、价值约6000亿美元的股权，解锁要求包括：

　　公司市值突破7.5万亿美元；

　　完成火星移民核心布局；

　　在火星落地100万常住人口。

　　这在任何理性投资者看来，都是天方夜谭。但这就是投行的基本功：用专业模型、海量数据、行业术语，把虚无缥缈的故事包装得逻辑自洽、看似可行。

　　“包子式”包装

　　用星链包裹xAI的资本游戏

　　从一线ECM投行分析师的内行视角来看，SpaceX的估值逻辑本质上是一套“层层嵌套打包”模式：

　　用盈利稳定、现金流优质的星链业务，包裹业绩惨淡、无法独立上市的xAI业务，形成“优质资产兜底、劣质资产挂靠”的包子式结构。

　　来看2025年的真实财务数据：

• 星链部门：收入114亿美元，盈利72亿美元（唯一优质资产）；

• 火箭发射部门：收入41亿美元，亏损6.62亿美元；

• xAI部门：收入13亿美元，亏损130亿美元（纯纯的包袱）。

　　看似三大核心业务协同发力，实则只有星链是核心盈利资产，其余业务均为亏损包袱。

　　这套打包模式还实现了“废物利用、税务套利”：xAI常年持续亏损，单独运营会导致大量税务抵扣额度作废。而通过整体打包上市，所有亏损额度均可并入主体财报，合法抵扣利润、降低整体税负。

　　这就是华尔街的真实玩法：所谓的公允估值、专业模型，从来不是测算出来的，而是机构之间反复扯皮、博弈、妥协出来的“市场公约数”。

　　纳斯达克的“规则特供”

　　被动资金接盘局

　　为了确保上市成功，这次IPO的设计可谓是煞费苦心，其中最争议的莫过于纳斯达克专门为SpaceX修改规则。

　　规则修改内容：将纳入纳斯达克100指数的时间从3个月缩短至15天，而且是加权纳入（权重不合理拉高3倍）。

　　这意味着什么？

　　美国有大量被动指数基金、养老基金、401K退休金账户，会自动买入纳斯达克100成分股。也就是说，只要熬过15天，就可以用老百姓的养老金来给SpaceX接盘了。

　　据测算，仅被动基金强制配置的资金就高达100-200亿美元。

　　精明的资金早已提前布局：提前低价建仓，等待指数纳入、被动资金进场后高位套现。叠加散户狂热抢购、主动基金布局、中东热钱涌入，上市初期流通股稀缺，股价必然被暴力拉升，制造极致的赚钱效应。

　　这场狂欢的终极剧本，早已注定：

　　上市拉升后，马斯克、早期股东、核心员工会通过新股增发、股票质押贷款等方式持续套现（马斯克历来偏好质押套现，特斯拉时期亦是如此）。内部利益方离场完毕后，股价终将回归基本面，所有浮亏、泡沫风险，全部由后进场的机构和散户承接。

　　而这些机构资金，本质也是普通人的养老钱、理财钱。

　　星链业务遇瓶颈

　　对美军“趁火打劫”

　　很多人不知道的是，星链业务已经触及瓶颈，连带火箭发射业务的未来订单也存疑。

　　来看数据：

• 2025年一季度，星链用户规模1030万，比去年翻了一倍，但前一年可是翻了三倍的，增速明显下滑；

• 更可怕的是增长是怎么来的？平均每用户收入（ARPU）从2023年的99美元/月降到2024年的91美元，再降到2025年的80美元，到2025年一季度已经暴降至66美元。

　　完全是靠降价换量、打价格战！

　　原因不难理解：如果你住在纽约、东京、上海，根本不会用星链。星链就是给偏远地区用的，但偏远地区之所以偏远，就是因为人少。To C端增长见顶了。

　　那怎么办？只能对军方涨价。

　　前段时间美军在战场大量使用名为“卢卡斯”的一次性无人机，内置星链终端。前线激战正酣，SpaceX突然要求将网络费用翻5倍，从原先的5000美元/月直接涨到25000美元/月。

　　理由是：你原本买的是“地面套餐”，实际用在飞行器上，就得按“飞行器套餐”付款。

　　结果服软的居然是美军！媒体询问负责人，他只说SpaceX依然是“稳固可靠的长期合作伙伴”。

　　这件事充分说明：SpaceX已经具备对军方的议价能力，但这也暴露出其实体业务增长乏力的尴尬现实。

　　沃伦的三大“地雷”指控

　　沃伦在致SEC的信中，详细列举了SpaceX在财务和治理上的三大“地雷”：

　　1． xAI收购案可能存在会计造假或估值误导

　　SpaceX收购马斯克另一家公司xAI的过程中，交易定价是否公允？是否存在通过关联交易转移利益？这些问题都需要SEC彻查。

　　2． 马斯克个人利益与公司利益存在严重冲突

　　马斯克同时是SpaceX和xAI的大股东，两家公司之间的交易，本质上是“左手倒右手”。这种利益输送的风险，在IPO招股书中是否被充分披露？

　　3． 马斯克在公司内部拥有独断专行的权力，缺乏有效制衡

　　目前马斯克手握SpaceX 82%的投票权，意味着这家近2万亿估值的行业巨头，完全由他一人掌控，没有任何机构或股东能够制衡、干预。

　　成也创始人，险也创始人。 过去两年，马斯克极度痴迷AI和太空数据中心赛道，这意味着未来很长一段时间，SpaceX将持续投入巨额资本用于新业务研发和布局，重资产投入之下，战略失误、投入失败的风险极高。

　　资本慌乱

　　为什么急着上市？

　　很多人会问：SpaceX明明可以不用上市，为什么马斯克这么着急？

　　答案很简单：这不是企业发展需要，而是资本的集体慌乱。

　　原因一：全球风投行业迎来数十年最严峻的退出危机

　　世界经济论坛5月发布的最新数据显示：

• 当前全球未上市的独角兽企业中，20%已成立超15年，59%已成立超10年；

• 企业从种子轮到首轮退出的周期，相比2022年拉长了45%。

　　行业常规规则里，风投基金对LP的承诺退出周期仅为10年。这意味着，超半数独角兽早已超出约定退出期限，大量风投资金长期被套牢。

　　原因二：AI行业极度烧钱，融资窗口期短暂

　　OpenAI去年亏损超80亿美元，Anthropic去年亏损超30亿美元，且两家企业未来数年仍将持续大额烧钱。

　　业内普遍认为，AI行业泡沫已然存在，只是没人能精准预判破裂时间。马斯克急于落地IPO，就是为了抢占高位窗口期，锁定万亿估值，提前规避后续市场下跌风险。

　　原因三：抢占AI资本红利的末班车

　　当下是全球市场对AI概念溢价最高、资金最狂热的阶段。SpaceX抢先完成IPO，能够率先吸干华尔街所有AI+太空赛道的增量资金。

　　高端资本博弈向来朴素：先到先得、先上市先收割。

　　三个阶段：看清洗牌时刻

　　SpaceX上市必须看准三个阶段：

　　第一阶段：看上市当天能否不破发

　　如果流通盘这么小（仅释放5%股份）、承销团这么强、机构认购这么热还能破发，说明市场其实已经虚透了。

　　第二阶段：看上市后15到30天

　　能否顺利纳入纳斯达克100指数，把筹码成功交给被动基金（养老金）。

　　第三阶段：看半年后大股东解禁

　　5%的流通比例意味着95%的股份在IPO时处于锁定状态。半年后（12月初），这些股份将解除锁定。那些在几十亿、几百亿估值时入场的早期股东，将面临十几倍、几十倍甚至上百倍的暴利退出机会。

　　那将是怎样的一场腥风血雨？

　　谁是最大的赢家？

　　这场顶级资本盛宴里，收益圈层极度分化。

　　真正的赢家只有三类：

　　持股42%的马斯克本人——上市后财富将突破万亿级，成为全球首位万亿富翁；

　　合计持股10%-15%的公司核心员工——早期入局，成本极低；

　　早期入局的风投机构与股东——终于等到退出时刻。

　　除此之外，21家承销投行是最大的隐形赢家。

　　今年投行行业普遍低迷、降薪裁员，而SpaceX这一个超级项目，就能让所有参与投行团队超额盈利。后续还能持续解锁二级市场增发、可转债、并购交易、大宗交易、股票回购等持续业务，堪称投行的“年度飞升项目”，一年顶往年五年收益。

　　而输家呢？

　　所有脱离基本面的高估值狂欢，最终都会回归均值。狂欢落幕之后，永远是后进场的普通人承担所有风险。

　　历史的轮回

　　运河狂热与太空泡沫

　　最后，让我们用一个经典历史案例帮大家看懂本质。

　　19世纪全球掀起运河狂热，苏伊士运河、巴拿马运河开凿前夕，无数法国中产疯狂募资入局。最终巴拿马运河公司1889年破产，初代投资者尽数血本无归。

　　但运河最终成功通航，彻底改写了全球贸易格局，造福了后续上百年的全球经济和无数行业。可初代的基建投资者，几乎没有吃到任何时代红利。

　　如今的SpaceX、追捧它的华尔街资本，何尝不是当年的运河狂热？

　　我从不否认SpaceX的伟大，也不否认太空经济的星辰大海，但作为普通投资者，我们一定要克制对个人英雄主义的崇拜、对科幻浪漫叙事的盲从。

　　沃伦的警告，不该被忽视

　　SpaceX是实体产业的颠覆者，却是资本市场的收割者。

　　它用极致务实打破了传统航天的暴利与僵化，却用极致资本套路，打造了一场属于顶级圈层的泡沫盛宴。

　　伊丽莎白·沃伦的警告，不该被忽视。

　　SEC是否会在政治压力下叫停这场“资本狂欢”？马斯克将如何反击这位“死对头”的狙击？周五的上市计划是否会突遭变数？

　　这一切，都将在未来48小时内揭晓。

　　但无论结果如何，普通投资者都应该记住一句话：

　　所有脱离基本面的高估值狂欢，最终都会回归均值。狂欢落幕之后，永远是后进场的普通人承担所有风险。

　　这是一封美国参议院银行、住房与城市事务委员会成员伊丽莎白·沃伦（Elizabeth Warren）于2026年6月9日写给美国证券交易委员会（SEC）主席保罗·阿特金斯（Paul Atkins）的信函，要求SEC推迟SpaceX的IPO注册声明生效。

　　以下是全文翻译：

　　美国参议院银行、住房与城市事务委员会华盛顿特区 20510-6075

　　2026年6月9日

　　尊敬的保罗·阿特金斯主席： 美国证券交易委员会 东北F街100号 华盛顿特区 20549

　　阿特金斯主席：

　　我怀着极度关切的心情，就太空探索技术公司（Space Exploration Technologies Corp．，简称“SpaceX”）即将进行的首次公开募股（IPO）致函您。

　　据报道，由埃隆·马斯克（Elon Musk）拥有的航空航天和人工智能公司SpaceX，计划在本月晚些时候以高达2万亿美元的估值向投资者募集高达750亿美元——这将使其成为“史上最大规模的股市首秀”。然而，此次IPO似乎对普通投资者及其退休储蓄构成重大风险，同时为SpaceX内部人士（包括特朗普政府高级官员）带来巨大利益。

　　与SpaceX公开募股相关的风险源于该公司向证券交易委员会（“SEC”或“委员会”）提交的备案文件及其他公开报道中揭示的一系列问题：首先，SpaceX预计将以约100倍2025年营收的价格发行股票——这一估值倍数几乎史无前例，需要投资者对AI和太空两个领域的诸多假设抱以极大信心；其次，非传统的公司治理结构将使SpaceX首席执行官埃隆·马斯克拥有前所未有的权力，而投资者获得的权利将远低于传统公开股票购买者通常享有的权利；第三，主要股指提供商正在改写规则，为SpaceX快速进入其指数——以及驱动数百万美国人退休储蓄的投资基金——铺平道路。

　　最终的结果可能是灾难性的：如果SpaceX的估值崩溃，退休人员和家庭的投资者账户将遭受损失，且对任何公司不当行为几乎没有追索权，而地球上最富有的人则因缺乏监管而变得更加富有。SEC的核心使命是保护投资者，维护公平、有序和高效的市场。鉴于史上最大规模IPO对投资者保护和市场诚信构成的前所未有的威胁，您必须推迟任何加速注册声明生效的行为。

　　在允许公司向公众出售其股票之前，委员会必须考虑“公共利益和投资者保护”。在此过程中，委员会可以审查公司的初步招股说明书，以“确认其是否符合适用的会计标准和联邦证券法律法规的披露要求”。仅SpaceX IPO的巨大规模，在正常情况下就足以证明SEC进行仔细审查和关注投资者需求的合理性。但这些并非正常情况：诸多额外因素加剧了担忧，并要求SEC采取行动以履行其投资者保护和市场诚信职责，即推迟注册声明的生效。

　　SpaceX的估值与会计

　　SpaceX股票的价值——无论是现在还是可预见的未来——似乎建立在一系列独特的投机性事件之上。据《金融时报》报道，SpaceX目前的财务状况“对于计算公司价值毫无用处”，部分原因是评估尚不存在的活动的固有挑战，但这些活动可能成为一家使命崇高（“将意识之光延伸到星辰”）的公司增长的一部分。据晨星（Morningstar）的一份报告，SpaceX的价值可能不到其1.75万亿美元估值的一半。

　　事实上，“以《金融时报》此前报道的1.75万亿美元估值计算，SpaceX将成为美国股市第七大公司。然而，按每年190亿美元的营收排名，它仅位列第200位，与幸运符麦片制造商通用磨坊（General Mills）相当。”市场“从未有过对一只如此投机却又如此庞大的股票进行定价的先例”，“最大的问题是，高达1.8万亿美元的估值能否在公开市场中持续”。部分问题在于准确评估SpaceX的崇高目标（包括太空旅行和星际居住）是不可能的。但这也是该公司持续亏损和未能实现过去目标的产物。因此，市场分析师对其目标估值背后的数学逻辑提出了质疑，称之为“荒谬的”、“烟幕弹式的会计”和“真正脱离现实的”。如果该估值无法持续，选择以高估值买入的投资者——或因投资于指数基金而被迫买入的投资者，而这些基金本身基于已修改规则以纳入SpaceX的指数——将为此付出代价。

　　此外，IPO的估值部分由SpaceX与xAI的2026年合并决定。由于埃隆·马斯克身处交易双方，“他亲自与自己谈判交易，自己设定相对估值，自己签署合并协议，自己完成交易，然后才告知董事会和股东”。这让马斯克有机会将xAI的估值抬高到超过其资产价值的水平——换句话说，单方面决定自己交易的价值——并将其纳入即将进行的IPO。SEC应评估SpaceX与xAI之间（以及埃隆·马斯克控制的其他公司组成的完整网络）的交易和关系是否因不准确或误导性的会计或估值而对投资者构成风险。鉴于众多主动和被动投资者将暴露于SpaceX的风险之下，缺乏基本面支撑的估值可能威胁我们资本市场的完整性和稳定性。

　　SpaceX-xAI合并是马斯克先生控制的不同商业实体之间一系列共同控制交易中的一例——引发了关于SpaceX未来计划与其控制的公司进行整合的任何疑问。例如，正如商业媒体推测的那样，如果特斯拉（Tesla）和SpaceX合并，可能立即触发马斯克先生1万亿美元的特斯拉薪酬方案，因为控制权变更条款将取消此前解锁股票所需的业绩条件。将这些新的特斯拉股票转换为新的SpaceX股票可能对SpaceX股东产生重大影响。如果确实存在将特斯拉和SpaceX合并的计划，此类计划应向潜在投资者披露，因为它们应被视为对公司业务战略和公开募股后续价值具有重大重要性的事项。鉴于SpaceX的S-1备案文件未提及此类合并对SpaceX估值的影响——尽管它承认与马斯克先生其他企业的业务交易可能发生——SEC应在加速SpaceX注册声明生效之前，对马斯克先生关于其众多强大企业所有权结构的未来意图进行彻底调查。

　　IPO后的公司治理

　　IPO还引发担忧，因为SpaceX的IPO后公司治理结构侵蚀了基本的股东权利，并将非同寻常的公司权力授予马斯克先生。公开交易公司理应对其股东负责。SpaceX的IPO将颠覆这一模式，股东提供数十亿美元的新资本，却没有任何对马斯克先生或公司领导层的问责措施，因为公司“结合了超级投票权股票、强制仲裁、更严格的股东提案规则以及德克萨斯州公司法，将控制权赋予SpaceX首席执行官埃隆·马斯克和其他内部人士。SpaceX还将限制投资者挑战管理层、在法庭起诉以及强制召开代理权争夺的能力”。

　　正如领先的公司法学者所言，“即使是马斯克的崇拜者，也应该对SpaceX的公司治理感到不安”。

　　SpaceX的初步招股说明书表明，公司将维持双重股权结构，马斯克先生持有的每一股股票的投票权是向公众发售的每一股股票的10倍。这种不对称性将剥夺股东对重大公司决策（如收购、剥离或重组）的任何权力。正如公司招股说明书所承认的，“马斯克先生将能够控制需要股东批准的事项的结果”。此外，拟议的公司治理结构实质上剥夺了董事会的管理公司权力，使其无法解雇首席执行官：“马斯克只能由B类股东多数投票罢免董事长或首席执行官——而他个人控制该股票类别93.6%的股份——实际上保证了他的职位。”正如《金融时报》社论版所言，“传统的治理制衡几乎完全缺失……[马斯克]将对投票权和董事会拥有几乎不可挑战的控制权”。

　　问题更加复杂的是，“在其他非典型安排中，SpaceX不计划让其董事会多数成员为独立董事”，包括“不使用独立董事委员会来决定高管薪酬，这是大多数公司的做法”。马斯克的地位很可能因其在董事会中强大朋友的存在而得到巩固，包括安东尼奥·格拉西亚斯（Antonio Gracias）和史蒂夫·尤尔韦森（Steve Jurvetson）。据报道，格拉西亚斯先生和尤尔韦森先生与马斯克先生私交甚密，并且是GPS信号市场的竞争对手。这引发了公司治理担忧，并存在违反反垄断法禁止关联董事（即公司董事同时担任其竞争对手董事会成员）的风险。

　　SpaceX还试图限制股东通过法院获得法律救济的途径。根据其S-1备案文件，SpaceX计划通过强制大多数股东诉讼进入仲裁程序，使马斯克免受法律风险——这是一个不公开且系统性地偏向公司利益的过程。重要的是，仲裁将是联邦证券法下诉讼的唯一选择，因为德克萨斯州商业法院——SpaceX首选的法律争议审理地——对相关联邦证券法没有管辖权，这与S-1中声称该领域法律“尚未确定”的说法相反。虽然该条款最终可能无法执行，但SEC最近推翻了一项长期立场，即IPO中的强制仲裁条款不符合“公共利益和投资者保护”，这才使这种尝试成为可能。此外，“SpaceX选择了一项条款，仅允许持有公司3%或以上股份的股东提起所谓的‘派生’诉讼，代表公司起诉董事会或首席执行官——就像在更利于股东的特拉华州，一位小投资者提起的特斯拉薪酬投诉那样。如果SpaceX达到预期的1.75万亿美元估值，起诉的股东将需要至少525亿美元的股份。”SpaceX还打算通过提高股东提案门槛来保护马斯克对公司的单方面控制权，禁止其大多数投资者强制在股东大会上进行投票。

　　马斯克先生对SpaceX的权力程度尤其令人担忧，因为他的利益与SpaceX股东和投资者的利益之间不可避免地会产生冲突。公司招股说明书也承认了这一点：在向SEC提交的修订文件中，SpaceX承认，“未来可能在我们与马斯克先生及其拥有或关联的实体之间，就业务交易、潜在竞争活动或其他商业机会等方面产生利益冲突。在正常业务过程中，我们与其中一些公司进行了各种交易。”它继续写道：“马斯克先生或其关联方可能不时了解到某些商业机会（如收购机会或技术发展），并可能将这些机会导向他们投资的其他企业，在这种情况下，[投资者]可能无法了解或无法追求此类机会。”招股说明书还详细说明了马斯克先生——作为对SpaceX负有受托责任的公司董事——如何也可能拥有与SpaceX竞争的其他公司的资产：

　　根据我们的章程，马斯克先生及其关联方不受限制地拥有与我们直接或间接竞争的资产或从事业务，并且没有义务避免从事与我们相同或类似的业务活动或业务线，包括被视为与我们竞争的业务活动或业务线，或与我们的任何客户或供应商开展业务。此外，我们过去曾与马斯克先生关联的实体进行交易，未来也可能继续如此。我们可能选择此类交易，而非追求其他一些股东可能更喜欢或可能比我们选择追求的机会更具增值性的机会。

　　SpaceX招股说明书的这些条款表明，其IPO将是史上规模最大的，也可能拥有史上最被操纵的公司结构。如果IPO以其当前形式获批，马斯克在SpaceX拥有的独特且不受约束的权力将对投资者、市场和公众造成严重担忧。此次IPO最终为未来IPO树立了危险的先例。

　　对被动投资者和资本市场的影响

　　关于SpaceX的估值和公司治理担忧，如果其IPO注册声明的生效被加速，将对市场诚信产生重大担忧。对于挑选和选择特定投资的投资者，他们至少能够避免投资于从事风险或不公平行为的公司。但SpaceX的IPO创造了一个新的担忧：主要股市指数正在被操纵，以迫使指数基金中的数百万投资者——这是一种通常成本较低、对散户投资者有吸引力的投资选择——投资SpaceX，并在没有选择的情况下面临SpaceX的重大风险。“分析师估计，在纳入后的几个月内，标普500、纳斯达克100和罗素1000追踪器将保守地强制买入150亿至300亿美元的SpaceX股票，更激进的流通股权重情景则会高得多”。

　　除上述公开交易股票向散户投资者的超额分配外，SpaceX的IPO还将使被动和主动投资者都面临重大风险。

　　主要股指有一套明确的规则来确定是否以及何时纳入新公司。这些规则为股票购买者提供了重要的投资者保护，使其免受新上市IPO的波动性和不确定性影响，并允许市场发现机制在指数纳入之前为公开公司建立公平价格。这些规则通常包括成熟度和可行性要求。例如，标普500要求公司在指数纳入前至少公开交易12个月，并且至少连续四个季度实现盈利。

　　但据报道，SpaceX已游说指数提供商改变其指数纳入规则。指数提供商也照办了，进行了修改，使SpaceX等大型科技公司更容易被快速纳入被动投资者的投资组合。4月，标普道琼斯指数公司宣布正在考虑修改规则，以便更容易让“超大市值”（MegaCap）公司——即股市中最大的公司——快速进入其指数。仅就标普500而言，该公司正在考虑的修改包括将标准的12个月IPO后等待期缩短至6个月，取消标准的10%流通股权要求，并豁免超大市值公司满足所有其他公司都需要满足才能符合资格的财务可行性标准。2026年6月4日，该公司宣布放弃拟议的修改，声明“不应仅基于市值授予财务可行性、成熟度和IWF（可投资权重因子）要求的例外”。除标普道琼斯指数外，尚无关于主要指数撤销为SpaceX做出的修改和例外的大规模报道。2026年5月1日，纳斯达克100实施了一项新的“快速进入”规则，允许按市值排名前40的公司在上市第七天就有资格被纳入。富时罗素（FTSE Russell）也效仿了。正如《华尔街日报》报道的那样，该公司“修改了规则，使新上市的大型公司更容易进入其美国指数，为被动投资者快速获取SpaceX和其他备受瞩目的上市公司的股票打开了大门”。

　　指数提供商对新公开募股的不同处理方式可能导致投资者对股票敞口的预期出现差异。此外，正如一位分析师警告的那样，这些不断变化的政策“可能在‘被动’指数之间造成显著的回报差异”。

　　对于投资于为SpaceX放宽规则的指数基金的投资者，这些修改可能导致他们被迫购买数十亿美元的SpaceX股票，而他们对此没有任何发言权。突然间，美国人的退休储蓄或养老金可能与SpaceX的市值挂钩。股票的普遍性将人为推高其价值，而SpaceX内部人士——得益于允许他们比往常更早出售股票的特殊规则——将能够迅速抛售其股份，让散户投资者接盘。结果可能是巨大的财富向上再分配——即使SpaceX没有盈利。简而言之，这些修改可能使一项金融工程计划得以实施，该计划操纵美国资本市场以 favor 马斯克先生及其盟友。正如一位《金融时报》评论员所言，“为什么标普道琼斯指数公司……似乎在 flirt with 一项放宽规则的修改，以允许埃隆·马斯克的卫星到AI公司快速进入？”这是SEC和指数提供商应该向公众回答的问题。

　　有利于SpaceX的修改不仅限于指数——大型资产管理公司也在做出改变。2026年6月4日，管理着16.4万亿美元资产的富达投资（Fidelity Investments）“将其SpaceX IPO准入要求从高达50万美元大幅削减至仅2，000美元”，为历史上最大的股票首秀之一向数百万散户投资者敞开了大门。因此，SpaceX新IPO的风险不仅限于大型机构投资者，还将波及小型个人投资者，因为此次IPO似乎缺乏通常存在的许多投资者和市场保护。

　　在考虑SpaceX IPO对投资者的风险时，您还必须考虑到，这些风险将因SpaceX股票被纳入主要指数以及通过主要资产管理公司和投资顾问向散户投资者开放而立即被放大。这创造了一种情景：当前SpaceX股东——包括特朗普政府高级官员——可以在危及美国投资者和我们金融稳定的同时使自己致富。

　　其他需要推迟生效的问题

　　除关于SpaceX财务披露、公司治理以及操纵股市指数以利于自身的诸多担忧外，还有三个其他考虑因素需要推迟公司注册文件的生效，并要求SEC进行彻底调查。首先，存在潜在证券法违规的问题，即关于SpaceX初始私人备案的泄露。早在SpaceX于2026年4月1日向SEC提交保密注册声明之前，新闻报道就携带了关于招股说明书内容的信息，并引发了投资者兴趣。如果这些泄露是SpaceX为在IPO前增加市场兴趣而进行的协调尝试的结果，可能构成证券法第5条的违规，该条款禁止“抢跑”（gun-jumping）——在提供注册声明之前出售或宣传股票。法律规定，“除非注册声明对某种证券已生效，否则任何人直接或间接……使用州际贸易或邮件的任何交通或通讯手段或工具，通过任何招股说明书或其他方式出售该证券，均属违法。”由于SpaceX在任何注册声明之前就已受到关于上市的非同寻常的公众关注，SEC应加强对SpaceX IPO策略的审查，以确保公司未违反第5条。

　　其次，存在马斯克先生在X上发布关于公司的声明所引发的市场混乱问题——X是他也拥有的社交媒体平台，现在属于SpaceX的xAI部门。一些金融记者认为，这些声明与SpaceX公开备案文件中的业务信息存在实质性矛盾。无论这些偏差是否重大，马斯克先生以在X上凭一时兴起发布公开声明而闻名，这些声明可以瞬间撼动市场。他还以尽管未实现宏大的业务目标却兑现巨额薪酬方案而闻名。如果这种行为模式持续下去，将对SpaceX的可信度产生重大怀疑，以及其备案的IPO是否充分告知投资者与马斯克先生相关的风险。

　　关于证券法违规和马斯克先生矛盾声明的担忧，足以让SEC推迟SpaceX注册声明的生效，并允许市场有一段冷静期，以更彻底地评估SpaceX IPO的合理性。

　　结论与问题

　　SpaceX的IPO似乎为股东和未来公开公司上市呈现了独特且开创先例的风险。公司的会计和财务报告存在令人不安的漏洞，并被今年早些时候发生的大规模且不透明的xAI合并所笼罩。公司的公司治理结构将独特的权力授予其首席执行官，并严重限制股东权利。主要股指在放弃旧规则或制定新规则以允许SpaceX纳入方面的共谋，意味着数十亿美元的被动投资将被迫进入该公司，使退休人员和普通投资者面临风险。

　　简而言之，投资者和公众对SpaceX及其计划如何使用其寻求募集的数十亿美元存在众多未解答的重大问题。SEC不应在未经严格审查SpaceX财务报表、公司治理结构及其可能对散户投资者（包括通过指数基金）的影响的情况下，加速SpaceX注册声明的生效。

　　我要求您在2026年6月23日之前，对以下问题提供详细答复：

　　SEC打算如何评估SpaceX关于其估值的主张，基于其对太空旅行、多行星居住和“将意识之光延伸到星辰”等主张？请包括关于以下方面的具体信息： a． 任何潜在的高估来源 b． SpaceX提出的估值（1.75万亿美元）与其营收（每年190亿美元）之间的差异

　　SEC确保投资者获得清晰准确披露的计划是什么，尽管存在复杂的会计问题？请提供关于以下方面的具体信息： a． 近期xAI收购的估值 b． 联合创始人离职的影响 c． SpaceX各子公司（包括发射、星链和xAI）的营收和亏损，包括星链用户群的行业标准信息 d． 承销银行之间任何潜在的利益冲突 e． SpaceX审计师的严谨性和独立性，包括任何潜在的利益冲突 f． 任何可能对SpaceX股票价值产生重大影响的预期未来合并或重大交易

　　SEC是否认为，从保密备案草案泄露的信息已实质性增加了市场对SpaceX首次公开募股的兴趣？

　　鉴于有报道称保密备案草案的信息被不当泄露，可能构成“抢跑”，SEC是否考虑过推迟SpaceX的首次公开募股？

　　SEC在评估IPO时，计划如何考虑SpaceX的公司结构——该结构将几乎完全的控制权授予一个人？请提供关于以下方面的具体信息： a． 其双重股权结构 b． 埃隆·马斯克对投票权的控制 c． 董事会成员的独立性，鉴于他们与控股股东马斯克先生的个人和业务关系 d． SpaceX与马斯克先生控制的其他实体之间潜在的利益冲突交易

　　SEC计划如何保护被动投资者免受SpaceX股票的风险，包括： a． 机构投资者（如养老基金），以及 b． 被动指数基金的股东

　　SEC是否会寻求SpaceX关于州法院对《交易法》索赔管辖权结论的法律依据？

　　此致

　　伊丽莎白·沃伦 银行、住房与城市事务委员会 资深成员（Ranking Member）

　　TIM SCOTT SOUTH CAROLINA， CHAIRMAN

　　ELIZABETH WARREN MASSACHUSETTS， RANKING MEMBER

　　MIKE CRAPO， IDAHO

　　JACK REED， RHODE ISLAND

　　MIKE ROUNDS， SOUTH DAKOTA

　　MARK R． WARNER， VIRGINIA

　　THOM TILLIS， NORTH CAROLINA

　　CHRIS VAN HOLLEN， MARYLAND

　　JOHN KENNEDY， LOUISIANA

　　CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO， NEVADA

　　BILL HAGERTY， TENNESSEE

　　TINA SMITH， MINNESOTA

　　CYNTHIA LUMMIS， WYOMING

　　RAPHAEL G． WARNOCK， GEORGIA

　　KATIE BOYD BRITT， ALABAMA

　　ANDY KIM， NEW JERSEY

　　PETE RICKETTS， NEBRASKA

　　RUBEN GALLEGO， ARIZONA

　　JIM BANKS， INDIANA

　　LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER， DELAWARE

　　KEVIN CRAMER， NORTH DAKOTA

　　ANGELA D． ALSOBROOKS， MARYLAND

　　BERNIE MORENO， OHIO

　　DAVID McCORMICK， PENNSYLVANIA

　　JANIE FAULKNER， STAFF DIRECTOR

　　JON DONENBERG， DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

　　United States SenateCOMMITTEE ON BANKING， HOUSING， AND URBAN AFFAIRSWASHINGTON， DC 20510-6075

　　June 9， 2026

　　The Honorable Paul Atkins

　　Chair

　　U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission

　　100 F Street NE

　　Washington， DC 20549

　　Dear Chair Atkins，

　　I write with extreme concern regarding the upcoming initial public offering （IPO） of Space Exploration Technologies Corp． （“SpaceX”）． According to reports， SpaceX， an aerospace and artificial intelligence company owned by Elon Musk， seeks to target a valuation of upwards of $2 trillion and raise up to $75 billion from investors in its offering later this month – making it “the largest stock-market debut in history．” However， this IPO appears to present significant risks to ordinary investors and their retirement savings – while carrying enormous advantages for SpaceX insiders， including senior Trump Administration officials．

　　The risks associated with SpaceX‘s public offering are caused by a confluence of concerns revealed by the company’s filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission （“SEC，” or “the Commission”） and other public reporting： first， “SpaceX is expected to offer stock at roughly 100 times 2025 revenue — a valuation multiple with little precedent， and one that requires numerous leaps of faith around both the AI and space theses；” second， a non-traditional governance structure that will leave SpaceX‘s CEO， Elon Musk， with an unprecedented level of power， and investors with significantly fewer rights than those traditionally offered to purchasers of public shares； and third， major stock index providers rewriting their rules to fast track SpaceX’s entry into their indexes — and into the investment funds that power millions of Americans‘ retirement savings．

　　The net result could be disastrous： a scenario where retirees‘ and families’ investment accounts take a hit if SpaceX‘s valuation falters， with little recourse for any corporate misconduct， while the wealthiest man on earth becomes even wealthier due to a lack of oversight． The SEC’s core mission is to protect investors and maintain fair， orderly， and efficient markets． Given the unprecedented threats to investor protection and market integrity posed by the biggest IPO in history， you must delay any eventual acceleration of the registration statement‘s effectiveness accordingly． Before the company is allowed to go public， the SEC must investigate whether index funds and other financial entities involved in SpaceX’s IPO are adequately protecting investors， and the company must fill disclosure gaps related to valuation， ensure risks and details related to its concentrated governance structure are clear to investors， and abandon mandatory arbitration to provide shareholders whose rights are otherwise gutted in this structure a minimum avenue for recourse．

　　SpaceX‘s IPO Process and the SEC’s Role

　　SpaceX has been privately held since its founding by Elon Musk in 2002， raising approximately $9 billion in equity capital through private markets． Remaining private has allowed Mr． Musk to retain extensive control over the company． Mr． Musk， in addition to being the founder， serves as Chief Executive Officer， Chief Technology Officer， and Chairman of the Board， in addition to being the controlling shareholder． Earlier this year， SpaceX combined with another privately held company founded and controlled by Mr． Musk， xAI， in “the biggest merger in history．．． to create a $1.25 trillion giant．” SpaceX filed its IPO registration statement with the SEC on May 20， 2026， having reportedly filed a confidential registration around April 1， 2026． If the SpaceX IPO goes through at the target valuations， the “blockbuster listing will unlock vast new wealth for SpaceX executives and investors ．．． But all of the holdings pale in comparison to the riches that Musk will unlock． He holds [vested shares] which could be worth about $700bn． A successful listing could see him become the world‘s first trillionaire．”

　　Before allowing a company to sell its shares to the public， the Commission is required to consider “the public interest and the protection of investors．” In so doing， the Commission may review the company‘s preliminary prospectus “for compliance with the applicable accounting standards and the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws and regulations．” The massive size of the SpaceX IPO alone， under normal circumstances， would justify careful SEC review and attention to investor needs． But these are not normal circumstances： a number of additional factors exacerbate concerns and require action by the SEC to meet its investor protection and market integrity mandates by delaying the effectiveness of SpaceX’s registration statement．

　　SpaceX‘s Valuation and Accounting

　　The value of SpaceX shares – now and in the foreseeable future – appears to be based on a uniquely speculative series of events． According to the Financial Times， SpaceX‘s finances today “are of no use in working out what the company is worth，” in part because of the inherent challenge of valuing activities that don’t yet exist but could be part of the growth of a company whose lofty mission is to “extend the light of consciousness to the stars．” According to a report from Morningstar， SpaceX may be worth less than half of the $1.75 trillion valuation it seeks．

　　Indeed， “[a]t the valuation of $1.75tn previously reported by Financial Times， SpaceX would be the U.S． stock market‘s seventh-largest company． However， when ranked by its revenue of $19 billion a year， it would be 200th， on par with Lucky Charms cereal maker General Mills．” The market has “never before had to price a stock so speculative yet so large，” and “[t]he big question is whether a valuation as large as $1.8 trillion can be sustained in public markets．” Part of the problem is the impossibility of accurately valuing SpaceX’s lofty goals， including space travel and interplanetary habitation． But it is also the product of the company‘s consistent negative profitability， and on its failure to meet past goals． As a result， market analysts have raised concerns about the math underlying SpaceX’s target valuation， calling it “nonsensical，” “smoke-and-mirrors accounting，” and “truly out of this world．” If that valuation cannot be sustained， the investors who have chosen to buy in at lofty valuations – or will be forced to do so because of their investments in index funds， that are themselves based on indexes that have amended their rules to include SpaceX – will pay the price．

　　Additionally， the IPO‘s value is set in part by SpaceX’s 2026 merger with xAI． Since Elon Musk was on both sides of the transaction， “he negotiate[d] the deal with himself， set the relative valuations himself， sign[ed] the merger agreement， close[d] the deal， and then [told] the boards and shareholders about it．” This gave Mr． Musk an opportunity to inflate the valuation of xAI in excess of its assets – in other words， unilaterally deciding the value of his own transaction – and roll this into the upcoming IPO． The SEC should evaluate whether transactions and other relationships between SpaceX and xAI （as well as the full web of other companies under Elon Musk‘s control） present risks to investors from inaccurate or misleading accounting or valuation． Given the range of both active and passive investors who will be exposed to SpaceX’s risk， valuations that are not supported by fundamentals may threaten the integrity and stability of our capital markets．

　　The SpaceX-xAI merger is one in a series of common-control transactions between different business entities controlled by Mr． Musk – raising questions about any future plans SpaceX might have to integrate with Musk-controlled firms． For example， should Tesla and SpaceX merge as the business press has speculated， it could instantly trigger Mr． Musk‘s $1 trillion Tesla pay package due to a change in control provision that voids the performance conditions previously required to unlock the shares． Converting these new Tesla shares into new SpaceX shares could have significant implications for SpaceX shareholders． If plans do in fact exist to merge Tesla and SpaceX， such plans should be disclosed to prospective investors， as they should be considered materially important to the business strategy of the company and subsequent value of the public offering． Given that SpaceX’s S-1 makes no mention of the effect such a merger would have on SpaceX‘s valuation – even as it acknowledges that business transactions with Mr． Musk’s other ventures may occur – the SEC should conduct a thorough inquiry into Mr． Musk‘s future intentions regarding the ownership structure of his many powerful businesses before accelerating the effectiveness of SpaceX’s registration statement．

　　Post-IPO Corporate Governance

　　The IPO also poses concerns because SpaceX‘s post-IPO governance structure erodes fundamental shareholder rights and vests an extraordinary level of corporate power in Mr． Musk． Publicly traded companies are meant to be accountable to their shareholders． The SpaceX IPO will flip this model on its head， with shareholders providing billions of dollars in new capital with no accountability measures for Mr． Musk or company leadership， as the company “[combines] supervoting shares， mandatory arbitration， stricter rules on shareholder proposals and Texas corporate law to give control to SpaceX CEO Elon Musk and other insiders． SpaceX also will limit investors’ ability to challenge management， sue in court， and force proxy contests．”

　　As leading corporate law scholars put it， “even Musk admirers should be troubled by SpaceX‘s governance．”

　　SpaceX‘s preliminary prospectus indicates that the company will maintain a dual-class share structure， with each share held by Mr． Musk holding 10 times as much voting power as a share of the class offered to the public． Such asymmetry will deny shareholders any power over major corporate decisions like acquisitions， divestments， or restructuring． As the company’s prospectus admits， “Mr． Musk will be able to control the outcome of matters requiring shareholder approval．” In addition， the proposed governance structure essentially eliminates the Board of Directors‘ authority to manage the company， stripping it of the ability to fire the Chief Executive Officer： “Musk can only be removed as chair or chief executive by a majority vote of the class B shareholders — and personally controls 93.6 per cent of the share class — in effect guaranteeing his position．” As the editorial board of the Financial Times put it， “[t]raditional governance checks are almost entirely absent．．．． [Musk] will have a virtually unchallengeable grip on voting rights and the board．”

　　Compounding the problem is that “among [other] atypical arrangements， SpaceX does not plan to have the majority of its board be independent directors，” including “not us[ing] a committee of independent board members to determine executive compensation， as most companies do．” Musk‘s position is likely to be entrenched by the presence of his powerful friends on the board of directors， including Antonio Gracias and Steve Jurvetson． Mr． Gracias and Mr． Jurvetson are reportedly personally close to Mr． Musk and competitors in the market for GPS signals． This raises corporate governance concerns， and runs the risk of violating antitrust laws banning interlocking directorates in which corporate directors sit on the boards of their competitors．

　　SpaceX is also attempting to limit shareholders‘ access to the courts for legal remedies． According to its S-1 filing， SpaceX plans to insulate Musk from legal risk by forcing most shareholders’ suits into arbitration， a process hidden from public view and systematically tilted in favor of the company‘s interests． Importantly， arbitration would be the only option for suits under federal securities law， because the Texas Business Court – SpaceX’s preferred forum for legal disputes – does not have jurisdiction over the relevant federal securities laws， contrary to the S-1‘s assertion that the law in this area is “unsettled．” While the provision may not ultimately be enforceable， such an attempt has been made possible by the SEC’s recent reversal of a longstanding position that forced arbitration clauses in IPOs were not in “the public interest and protection of investors．” Furthermore， “SpaceX has opted for a provision that allows only shareholders holding 3 per cent or more of a company‘s shares to bring a so-called ’derivative‘ lawsuit on behalf of the company suing the board or chief executive， like the Tesla pay complaint filed by a tiny investor in the more shareholder-hospitable Delaware． Should SpaceX hit its expected $1.75tn valuation， a suing shareholder would need a stake of at least $52.5bn．” SpaceX also intends to protect Musk’s unilateral control over the company by raising the threshold for shareholder proposals， prohibiting most of its investors from forcing a vote at a shareholder meeting．

　　The degree of Mr． Musk‘s power over SpaceX is especially concerning because of the conflicts that will inevitably arise between his interests and those of SpaceX’s shareholders and investors． The company‘s prospectus says as much： In its amended filing with the SEC， SpaceX admits that “[c]onflicts of interest could arise in the future between us， on the one hand， and Mr． Musk and entities owned by or affiliated with him， on the other hand， concerning among other things， business transactions， potential competitive activities or other business opportunities． In the normal course of business， we have engaged in a variety of transactions with some of these companies．” It continues： “Mr． Musk or his affiliates may become aware， from time to time， of certain business opportunities （such as acquisition opportunities or technological developments） and may direct such opportunities to other businesses in which they have invested， in which case [investors] may not become aware of or otherwise have the ability to pursue such opportunity．” The prospectus also details how Mr． Musk – a corporate director with fiduciary obligations to SpaceX – may also own assets in other companies that compete with SpaceX：

　　Under our charter， Mr． Musk and his affiliates are not restricted from owning assets or engaging in businesses that compete directly or indirectly with us and will not have any duty to refrain from engaging， directly or indirectly， in the same or similar business activities or lines of business as us， including those business activities or lines of business deemed to be competing with us， or doing business with any of our customers or vendors． Moreover， we have in the past entered into， and may in the future enter into， transactions with entities affiliated with Mr． Musk． We may enter into such transactions in lieu of pursuing other opportunities that some other shareholders may prefer or that may prove to be more accretive than the opportunities we elect to pursue．

　　These provisions of SpaceX‘s prospectus indicate that its IPO will be the biggest in history and may also have the most rigged corporate structure in history． Should the IPO be approved in its current form， the uniquely unchecked power Musk will have at SpaceX creates serious concerns for investors， markets， and the public at large． This IPO ultimately sets a dangerous precedent for future IPOs．

　　Effects on Passive Investors and the Capital Markets

　　The valuation and corporate governance concerns regarding SpaceX raise significant concerns about market integrity should its IPO‘s effectiveness be accelerated． For investors who pick and choose their specific investments， they at least are able to avoid investing in companies that engage in risky or unfair practices． But the SpaceX IPO creates a new concern： that major stock market indexes are being rigged in a way that would force millions of investors in passive index funds – a generally lower cost investment option that can be attractive to retail investors – to invest in SpaceX and face exposure to SpaceX’s significant risks with no choice in the matter． “Analysts estimate conservative forced buying of $15 billion to $30 billion across S&P 500， Nasdaq-100 and Russell 1000 trackers in the months after inclusion， with more aggressive float-weighted scenarios running far higher．”

　　In addition to the above-average allocation of publicly traded stocks to retail investors， SpaceX‘s IPO will expose both passive and active investors to significant risk．

　　Major stock indexes have a clear set of rules to determine whether and when to add new companies． These rules provide important investor protections for stock purchasers from the volatility and uncertainty of newly-public IPOs and allow market discovery to establish a fair price for public companies prior to index inclusion． The rules typically include seasoning and viability requirements． For example， the S&P 500 has required that companies be publicly traded for at least twelve months and have at least four quarters of positive income prior to index inclusion．

　　But SpaceX has reportedly lobbied index providers to change the rules for inclusion on their indices． And the index providers have complied， with changes that would make it easier for large technology companies like SpaceX to be fast-tracked into passive investors‘ portfolios． In April， S&P Dow Jones announced it was considering changes to its rules to more easily enable “MegaCap” companies – the largest companies on the stock market – to be fast-tracked onto its indexes． For the S&P 500 alone， the firm was considering changes that included reducing the standard 12-month post-IPO waiting period to six months， eliminating the standard 10 percent float requirements， and exempting MegaCap companies from the financial viability criteria that all other companies are expected to meet in order to qualify． On June 4， 2026， the company announced it was foregoing the proposed changes， stating that “exceptions to the financial viability， seasoning， and IWF （investable weight factor） requirements should not be granted solely based on market capitalization．” Other than S&P Dow Jones， there has not been reporting of major indexes reversing changes and exceptions to long-standing rules that will be made for SpaceX． On May 1， 2026， the Nasdaq 100 implemented a new “fast entry” rule， which would allow companies in the top 40 by market capitalization to be eligible for inclusion on their seventh day of trading． FTSE Russell has followed suit． As the Wall Street Journal reports， the firm “changed its rules to make it easier for freshly minted megacaps to enter its U.S． indexes， opening the door for passive investors to quickly access shares in SpaceX and other high-profile listings．”

　　A divergence among index providers‘ approaches to new public offerings may lead to different investor expectations around stock exposure． Additionally， as one analyst warned， these shifting policies “could create significant return dispersion [between] ’passive‘ indexes．”

　　For investors in index funds that do bend the rules for SpaceX， the changes may lead to the forced purchase of billions of dollars of SpaceX stock without them having any say in the matter． Suddenly， American retirement savings or pensions may be tied to SpaceX‘s market capitalization． The stock’s ubiquity would artificially jack up its value， and SpaceX insiders – thanks to special rules allowing them to sell their shares sooner than usual – would be able to quickly sell off their shares， leaving retail investors holding the bag． What results could be a massive upward redistribution of wealth – even should SpaceX not be profitable． In short， these changes may enable a scheme of financial engineering that rigs America‘s capital markets in favor of Mr． Musk and his allies． As one Financial Times commentator put it， “Why on earth is [S&P Dow Jones Indices]．．． seemingly flirting with a rule-bending change to allow Elon Musk’s satellites-to-AI company a quick entry？” This is a question the SEC and the index providers should answer for the public．

　　Changes benefitting SpaceX are not limited to indexes – they are also being made by large asset managers． On June 4， 2026， Fidelity Investments， a firm with $16.4 trillion in administered assets， “slashed its SpaceX IPO entry requirement from as much as $500，000 to just $2，000，” opening one of the biggest stock debuts in history to millions of retail investors． The risk from SpaceX‘s new IPO will therefore not be limited to large institutional investors， but also small individual investors as the IPO appears to lack many of the investor and market protections that are typically in place．

　　As you consider the risks to investors from SpaceX‘s IPO， you must also factor that such risks will be immediately magnified by the inclusion of SpaceX stock on the major indexes and its availability to retail investors through major asset managers and investment advisors． This creates a scenario where current SpaceX shareholders – including senior Trump Administration officials – can enrich themselves while endangering American investors and the stability of our financial markets．

　　Other Issues Warranting Delayed Effectiveness

　　In addition to the multitude of concerns regarding SpaceX‘s financial disclosures， corporate governance， and efforts to rig stock market indexes in its favor， three other considerations warrant delaying the effectiveness of the company’s registration documents and demand thorough investigation from the SEC． First， there is the matter of potential Securities Act violations in the form of leaks regarding SpaceX‘s initial private filing． Well before SpaceX’s confidential SEC registration statement was filed on April 1， 2026， news reports carried information about the contents of the prospectus and generated investor interest． If these leaks were the result of a coordinated attempt by SpaceX to increase market interest in advance of an IPO， it might constitute a violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act， which prohibits “gun-jumping” – selling or publicizing shares before a registration statement has been provided． The law provides that “Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security， it shall be unlawful for any person， directly or indirectly ．．． to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise．” Because of the extraordinary publicity surrounding SpaceX going public in the advance of any registration statement， the SEC should increase scrutiny of SpaceX‘s IPO tactics to ensure that the company has not violated Section 5．

　　Second， there is the market confusion that has ensued from Mr． Musk making statements regarding the company on X – the social media platform he also owns， now under the xAI segment of SpaceX． It appears to some financial journalists that these statements materially contradict business information included in SpaceX‘s public filing． Whether or not the deviations are material， Mr． Musk is well-known to have a propensity to make public statements on X on whims that can instantly move markets． He is also known to cash out on large pay packages despite not meeting lofty business goals． If this pattern of behavior continues， it casts significant doubt on SpaceX’s credibility， and whether its IPO as filed sufficiently informs investors of the risks involved with Mr． Musk．

　　Concerns regarding a Securities Act violation and contradictory statements made by Mr． Musk give enough reason for the SEC to delay the effectiveness of SpaceX‘s registration， and allow the markets a cooling-off period to more thoroughly evaluate the soundness of SpaceX’s IPO．

　　Conclusion and Questions

　　The SpaceX IPO appears to present a unique and precedent-setting risk for shareholders and future public company offerings． The company‘s accounting and financial reports contain troubling gaps， and are clouded by the massive and opaque xAI merger that occurred earlier this year． The company’s corporate governance structure vests unique power in its CEO and severely limits shareholders‘ rights． And the complicity of major stock indices in waiving old rules or creating new ones to allow SpaceX’s inclusion means that billions of dollars of passive investments will be forced into the company， putting retirees and ordinary investors at risk．

　　In short， there are a multitude of unanswered material questions investors and the public have about SpaceX and what it is likely to do with the billions it seeks to raise． The SEC should not accelerate the effectiveness of SpaceX‘s registration without serious scrutiny of SpaceX’s financial statements， governance structure， and the impact it may have on retail investors， including through index funds．

　　I request detailed answers to the following questions no later than June 23， 2026：

　　How does the SEC intend to evaluate SpaceX‘s claims about its valuation on the basis of its claims regarding such things as space travel， multiplanetary habitation， and “extending the light of consciousness to the stars”？ Please include specific information about： a． Any potential sources of overvaluation b． The discrepancy between SpaceX’s proffered valuation （$1.75 trillion） and its revenues （$19 billion per year）

　　What is the SEC‘s plan to ensure investors receive clear and accurate disclosures despite complex accounting issues？ Please provide specific information about： a． The valuation of the recent xAI acquisition b． The impact of co-founder departures c． The revenues and losses of each of SpaceX’s subsidiaries， including Launch， Starlink， and xAI， including industry-standard information on Starlink‘s subscriber base d． Any potential conflicts of interest among underwriting banks e． The rigor and independence of SpaceX’s auditors， including any potential conflicts of interest f． Any intended future mergers or major transactions that could have a material effect on the value of SpaceX stock

　　Does the SEC believe that leaked information from the draft confidential filing has substantially increased market interest in SpaceX‘s initial public offering？

　　Has the SEC considered delaying SpaceX‘s initial public offering， given reports that information from the draft confidential filing was leaked improperly and could be considered “gun-jumping”？

　　How does the SEC plan to account for SpaceX‘s corporate structure， which vests nearly complete control in one person， in its evaluation of the IPO？ Please provide specific information about： a． Its dual-class share structure b． Elon Musk’s control of voting shares c． The independence of board members， given their personal and business relationships with Musk， the controlling shareholder d． Potential conflicted transactions between SpaceX and other entities Musk controls

　　What does the SEC plan to do to protect passive investors from the risks of SpaceX stock， including： a． Institutional investors （like pension funds）， and b． Stockholders of passive index funds

　　Will the SEC seek the legal basis for SpaceX‘s conclusion that the jurisdiction of state courts over Exchange Act claims is unsettled？

　　Sincerely，

　　[Signature]

　　Elizabeth Warren

　　Ranking Member

　　Committee on Banking， Housing， and Urban Affairs

　　Footnotes：

　　Bloomberg， “What to Know About the SpaceX IPO，” Anthony Hughes， May 29， 2026， https：//www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-29/what-to-know-about-the-spacex-ipo．

　　Bloomberg， “Trump Officials Held Millions of Dollars of SpaceX Ahead of IPO，” Annie Massa， Sophie Alexander， and Bill Allison， June 3， 2026， https：//www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-03/spacex-ipo-poised-to-enrich-trump-officials-who-hold-millions-in-stock．

　　Financial Times， “More takeaways from an S-1 for the ages，” Craig Coben， May 26， 2026．

　　Bloomberg， “SpaceX‘s Capital Needs Are Out of This World” Chris Bryant， June 3， 2026， https：//www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2026-06-03/spacex-ipo-elon-musk-capital-needs-are-out-of-this-world．

　　SpaceX， Amendment No． 1 to Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， June 1， 2026， https：//www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1181412/000162828026039276/spaceexplorationtechnologi.htm．

　　New York Times， “The Numbers， and Questions， Behind Musk‘s Mega-Merger，” Andrew Ross Sorkin et al．， February 3， 2026， https：//www.nytimes.com/2026/02/03/business/dealbook/spacex-xai-merger.html．

　　SpaceX， Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， May 20， 2026， https：//www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1181412/000162828026036936/spaceexplorationtechnologi.htm．

　　Reuters， “SpaceX files for IPO， sources say， offering investors stake in Musk‘s space ambitions，” Echo Wang， Manya Saini， and Joey Roulette， April 1， 2026， https：//www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/spacex-registers-take-rocket-maker-public-blockbuster-ipo-bloomberg-news-reports-2026-04-01/．

　　Financial Times， “Inside SpaceX‘s audacious IPO plan，” Ryan McMorrow et al．， May 20， 2026， https：//www.ft.com/content/a59be3cf-eee2-4b10-9c86-b6e4dc0dbbdb？syn-25a6b1a6=1．

　　15 U.S.C． § 77h； 17 C.F.R． § 230.461（b）．

　　U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， “Filing Review Process，” Sept． 27， 2019．

　　Financial Times， “How to make sense of SpaceX‘s nonsensical valuation，” May 21， 2026， https：//www.ft.com/content/58fcca43-9195-49e2-b1c3-0e3bfb0147cd？syn-25a6b1a6=1．

　　CNBC， “SpaceX is worth less than half of its $1.75 trillion IPO target， Morningstar says，” Joseph Wilkins， June 3， 2026， https：//www.cnbc.com/2026/06/03/morningstar-spacex-ipo-target-price-nasdaq.html．

　　Financial Times， “How to make sense of SpaceX‘s nonsensical valuation，” May 21， 2026．

　　Id．

　　Bloomberg， “What to Know About the SpaceX IPO，” Anthony Hughes， May 29， 2026．

　　Fortune， “Top analyst has harsh words for SpaceX debut： ‘We recommend that investors avoid this IPO’，” Shawn Tully， May 29， 2026， https：//fortune.com/2026/05/29/spacex-ipo-should-i-buy-bear-case-david-trainer/．

　　New York Times， “How SpaceX Is Structured to Favor Elon Musk，” Ryan Mac， May 26， 2026， https：//www.nytimes.com/2026/05/26/technology/spacex-elon-musk-pay-board-governance.html．

　　Financial Times， “How to make sense of SpaceX‘s nonsensical valuation，” May 21， 2026．

　　The Motley Fool， “Honestly， the SpaceX Prospectus Is Far Worse Than I Imagined，” Sean Williams， May 26， 2026， https：//www.fool.com/investing/2026/05/26/the-spacex-prospectus-is-far-worse-than-i-imagined/．

　　Fortune， “Top analyst has harsh words for SpaceX debut： ‘We recommend that investors avoid this IPO’，” Shawn Tully， May 29， 2026．

　　Bloomberg， “Musk‘s Moonshot Merger，” Matt Levine， February 3， 2026．

　　Forbes， “Elon Musk，” https：//www.forbes.com/profile/elon-musk/．

　　Fortune， “Elon Musk‘s SpaceX buys xAI in stunning deal valued at $1.25 trillion ahead of looming IPO，” Amanda Gerut， February 2， 2026， https：//fortune.com/2026/02/02/elon-musk-spacex-xai-ipo-trillion/．

　　Forbes， “Could Musk Merge SpaceX And Tesla？ Here‘s What Analysts—And Betting Markets—Say，” Ty Roush， May 27， 2026， https：//www.forbes.com/sites/tylerroush/2026/05/27/could-musk-merge-spacex-and-tesla-heres-what-analysts-and-betting-markets-say/； CNBC， “Will Elon Musk eventually merge SpaceX with Tesla？ Speculation is building，” Ananya Chetia， May 21， 2026， https：//www.cnbc.com/2026/05/21/will-elon-musk-eventually-merge-spacex-with-tesla-speculation-builds.html．

　　Yahoo！ Finance， “SpaceX-Tesla Merger Could Trigger Elon Musk‘s $1 Trillion Pay Package： Report，” Badar Shaikh， June 2， 2026， https：//finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/spacex-tesla-merger-could-trigger-123106691.html．

　　SpaceX， Amendment No． 1 to Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， June 1， 2026， p． 57．

　　Reuters， “The SpaceX IPO and the lost battle for shareholder rights，” Ross Kerber， May 13， 2026， https：//www.reuters.com/sustainability/sustainable-finance-reporting/spacex-ipo-lost-battle-shareholder-rights-rosskerber-2026-05-13/．

　　Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance， “Even Musk Admirers Should Be Troubled by SpaceX‘s Governance，” Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel， June 2， 2026， https：//corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/02/even-musk-admirers-should-be-troubled-by-spacexs-governance/．

　　SpaceX， Amendment No． 1 to Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， June 1， 2026， p． 2．

　　Id．

　　Financial Times， “Inside SpaceX‘s audacious IPO plan，” Ryan McMorrow et al．， May 20， 2026．

　　Financial Times， Editorial， “To infinity and beyond， with the SpaceX IPO，” May 22， 2026， https：//www.ft.com/content/0e5ab16c-957e-44d6-aa16-fe23412ef6df？syn-25a6b1a6=1．

　　New York Times， “How SpaceX Is Structured to Favor Elon Musk，” Ryan Mac， May 26， 2026．

　　Wall Street Journal， “The Money and Drugs That Tie Elon Musk to Some Tesla Directors，” Kirsten Grind et al．， February 3， 2024， https：//www.wsj.com/tech/elon-musk-tesla-money-drugs-board-61af9ac4．

　　“XONA Space Systems — Powerful Precise GPS，” Steve Jurvetson， May 8， 2024， https：//steve.blog/2024/05/08/xona-space-systems-powerful-precise-gps/； PR Newswire， “Xona Raises $92M to Rebuild Satellite Navigation for a New Era，” June 26， 2025， https：//www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/xona-raises-92m-to-rebuild-satellite-navigation-for-a-new-era-302491586.html； PC Magazine， “SpaceX to FCC： We Can Supply a GPS Alternative Through Starlink，” Michael Kan， May 14， 2025， https：//www.pcmag.com/news/spacex-to-fcc-we-can-supply-a-gps-alternative-through-starlink．

　　15 U.S.C． § 19．

　　SpaceX， Amendment No． 1 to Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， June 1， 2026， pp． 63-64．

　　New York Times， “How SpaceX Is Structured to Favor Elon Musk，” Ryan Mac， May 26， 2026； Capital Forum， “Transcript of Conference Call on Forced Arbitration and Corporate Power in the Courts with Brendan Ballou，” May 12， 2026， https：//thecapitolforum.com/resource/transcript-of-conference-call-on-forced-arbitration-and-corporate-power-in-the-courts-with-brendan-ballou/．

　　15 U.S.C． § 78aa （giving federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934）．

　　SpaceX， Amendment No． 1 to Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， June 1， 2026， p． 63．

　　U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， “Sunshine Act Notice，” September 10， 2025， https：//www.sec.gov/newsroom/meetings-events/sunshine-act-notice-open-meeting-091725．

　　Financial Times， “SpaceX to drive a Cybertruck through corporate governance norms，” Sujeet Indap， May 26， 2026， https：//www.ft.com/content/7f34d58b-da81-4778-bca1-7aa89b08afca？syn-25a6b1a6=1．

　　Reuters， “The SpaceX IPO and the lost battle for shareholder rights，” Ross Kerber， May 13， 2026； TradingKey， “SpaceX IPO： Musk Controls 85.1% Voting Power， Shareholders Waive Jury Trials and Class Actions，” Jay Qian， May 21， 2026， https：//www.tradingkey.com/analysis/stocks/us-stocks/261919584-elonmusk-spacex-ipo-tradingkey．

　　SpaceX， Amendment No． 1 to Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， June 1， 2026， p． 57．

　　Id．

　　Id．

　　Social Science Research Network， “The Growth and Consequences of Index Investing，” Anne-Florence Allard et al．， January 12， 2026， https：//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm？abstract_id=6056574．

　　Yahoo！ Finance， “SpaceX IPO could hit popular index funds — and your 401（k） — in as little as 5 trading days as indexes relax their rules，” Rudro Chakrabarti， June 1， 2026， https：//finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/spacex-ipo-could-hit-popular-101500534.html．

　　Id．

　　Bloomberg， “Index Funds Can‘t Say No to SpaceX，” Matt Levine， May 26， 2026， https：//www.bloomberg.com/opinion/newsletters/2026-05-26/index-funds-can-t-say-no-to-spacex； Financial Times， “Et tu， S&P 500？，” March 26， 2026， https：//www.ft.com/content/59adbe42-ca30-47f3-9cda-5415945e9368．

　　Business Insider， “Here‘s when SpaceX could show up in major indexes and popular ETFs after its IPO，” Naomi Buchanan， May 24， 2026， https：//www.businessinsider.com/spacex-ipo-index-investing-etfs-spy-vti-qqq-spcx-stock-2026-5； CNBC， “Elon Musk’s SpaceX weighs Nasdaq listing after seeking early index entry， Reuters sources say，” March 10， 2026， https：//www.cnbc.com/2026/03/10/elon-musks-spacex-weighs-nasdaq-listing-after-seeking-early-index-entry.html．

　　Yahoo！ Finance， “Elon Musk‘s SpaceX Could Be Fast-Tracked Into S&P 500 After IPO Under Proposed Rule Changes，” Badir Shaikh， May 2， 2026， https：//finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/elon-musks-spacex-could-fast-180121306.html．

　　Bloomberg， “Index Funds Can‘t Say No to SpaceX，” Matt Levine， May 26， 2026．

　　Id．

　　S&P Dow Jones Indices， “S&P Dow Jones Indices Consultation on Treatment of MegaCap Companies，” press release， April 30， 2026， https：//www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/documents/indexnews/announcements/20260430-1483123/1483123_spdji-us-indices-megacaps-consult-20260430.pdf．

　　Yahoo！ Finance， “SpaceX Faces Delay to S&P 500 Inclusion After Index Provider Keeps Existing Criteria （SPCX），” Fiona Craig， June 5， 2026， https：//finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/spacex-faces-delay-p-500-100109864.html．

　　Yahoo！ Finance， “Buckle Up， S&P 500 and Nasdaq Index Fund Investors． SpaceX Could Soon Become 1 of Your Largest Positions，” Daniel Foelber， May 31， 2026， https：//finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/buckle-p-500-nasdaq-index-162000546.html．

　　FTSE Russell， “Consultation for the Russell US Equity Indexes on the timing of IPOs and the treatment of companies with a high free float market capitalization，” February 2026．

　　Wall Street Journal， “FTSE Russell Latest to Make U.S． Index Inclusion Easier Ahead of SpaceX IPO，” Joe Stonor， May 27， 2026， https：//www.wsj.com/finance/stocks/ftse-russell-latest-to-make-u-s-index-inclusion-easier-ahead-of-spacex-ipo-35157adf．

　　Post on X by Eric Balchunas， June 4， 2026， https：//x.com/EricBalchunas/status/2062647912065044532？s=20．

　　CNBC， “SpaceX insiders will get to sell shares earlier than usual after the IPO，” Leslie Picker， May 21， 2026， https：//www.cnbc.com/2026/05/21/spacex-insiders-will-get-to-sell-shares-earlier-than-usual-after-the-ipo.html．

　　Financial Times， “Et tu， S&P 500？，” Robin Wigglesworth， March 26， 2026， https：//www.ft.com/content/59adbe42-ca30-47f3-9cda-5415945e9368．

　　RIABiz， “Fidelity soars to $16.4 trillion of assets， a 16% jump of $2.3 trillion for 12 months， and widens gap on BlackRock and Schwab，” Brooke Southall， August 14， 2025， https：//riabiz.com/a/2025/8/15/fidelity-soars-to-164-trillion-of-assets-a-16-jump-of-23-trillion-for-12-months-and-widens-gap-on-blackrock-and-schwab．

　　Yahoo！ Finance， “Fidelity Cuts SpaceX IPO Eligibility by 99%， But 5 Rules Could Cost You Access，” Lockridge Okoth， June 4， 2026， https：//finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/fidelity-cuts-spacex-ipo-eligibility-183319186.html．

　　Bloomberg， “Trump Officials Held Millions of Dollars of SpaceX Ahead of IPO，” Annie Massa， Sophie Alexander， and Bill Allison， June 3， 2026．

　　New York Times， “SpaceX Files to Go Public， Setting Stage for Huge I.P.O．，” Ryan Mac， Lauren Hirsch， and Maureen Farrell， April 1， 2026， https：//www.nytimes.com/2026/04/01/technology/spacex-ipo-elon-musk.html．

　　See， e.g．， Reuters， “Exclusive： Elon Musk‘s SpaceX weighs Nasdaq listing after seeking early index entry， sources say，” Anirban Sen and Echo Wang， March 10， 2026， https：//www.reuters.com/business/finance/elon-musks-spacex-weighs-nasdaq-listing-after-seeking-early-index-entry-sources-2026-03-10/； Reuters， “Exclusive： Musk rewrites IPO playbook with large slice of SpaceX stock for retail investors， source says，” Echo Wang， Milana Vinn， and Sabrina Valle， March 26， 2026， https：//www.reuters.com/business/finance/musk-rewrites-ipo-playbook-with-large-slice-spacex-stock-retail-investors-source-2026-03-26/．

　　Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute， “Gun Jumping，” https：//www.law.cornell.edu/wex/gun_jumping．

　　15 U.S.C． § 77e； 17 C.F.R． § 230.135．

　　Forbes， “Elon Musk‘s xAI Buys X — Here’s What That Means For You，” Kate O‘Flaherty， March 31， 2025， https：//www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2025/03/31/elon-musks-xai-buys-x-heres-what-that-means-for-you/．

　　CNBC， “SpaceX skeptics have added reason for concern after Musk comments diverge from IPO filing，” Lora Kolodny， May 29， 2026， https：//www.cnbc.com/2026/05/29/spacex-skeptics-concerned-as-musk-comments-diverge-from-ipo-filing.html．

　　CNBC， “Elon Musk‘s tweets are moving markets — and some investors are worried，” Sam Shead， January 29， 2021．

　　New York Times， “How SpaceX Is Structured to Favor Elon Musk，” Ryan Mac， May 26， 2026．